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According to E. Shostrom, a psychologist, 
“it’s amazing but in any conflict between a 
Hooligan and a Nice Fellow it is a Hooligan 
who loses”1. At that the researcher treats “a 
Nice Fellow” not as an unselfish romantic but 
as a calculating manipulator who counts on 
exaggerated care, love and attentiveness2. E. 
Shostrom probably absolutized his conclusion, 
paying little attention to direct physical conflicts 
that spring up in interpersonal as well as in 
intergovernmental relations. In our point of 
view, the importance of military force can be 
neither under- nor overstated. H. Kissinger 
believes that “almost all empires were created by 
force, but none of them can rely on it”3. Modern 
world is hardly kinder than it was centuries 
ago. However, as J.S. Nye (J.) argues, nowadays 
“power comes in many guises, and soft power is 
not weakness”4.
More than once Chinese leaders have pointed 
out to a great part they assign to “soft power” in 
the course of preservation and strengthening of 
the People’s Republic of China. In this regard 
Hu Jintao’s call “to raise the state’s cultural soft 
power” at the XVII congress of the Communist 
Party of China should be especially mentioned.
Many visitors to China wrote about 
Chinese élites’ primordial devotion to a “soft” 
style of political actions. V.I. Ivanenko who 
worked as a Soviet consul in the city of Hotan in 
southwestern Xinjiang in the years of 1940-1943 
wrote in his memoirs: “In front of us there was 
not a wall even. It was something as amorphous, 
enveloping, flexible and light as Chinese silk. You 
pressed but there was nothing to press: everything 
flexed, everything backed away. But when your 
pressure stopped, everything took its initial 
shape. Cold steel masters say, and not without 
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reason, that it’s easier to cut a blacksmith’s anvil 
than a silk headscarf thrown in the air”5.
Sun Tzu wrote: “The skillful leader 
subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; 
he captures their cities without laying siege to 
them; he overthrows their kingdom without 
lengthy operations in the field”6. Even 
“revolutionary operas” of the Maoist period paid 
much attention to various ruses and tricks. In 
1971, pending the USA President R. Nixon’s visit, 
“Hongqi” magazine published the article which 
suggested “opposing a revolutionary twofaced 
tactics to the enemy’s counter-revolutionary 
twofaced tactics” and carrying on an international 
struggle “flexibly”7.
In M. Leonard’s opinion, the conception 
of “soft power” has got a better development 
in modern Beijing than in Washington.  This 
approach “implies the ability to give others 
the opportunity to apprehend what you would 
like them to”. It doesn’t depend on economical 
doles or political tricks, but mainly bases upon 
attractiveness of your culture and ideological 
views to others, upon your devotion to legal 
standards and your abilities to set the tone in 
international organizations”8. Liu Jianfei believes 
that in the future “in the course of quite a long 
period of time China’s international responsibility 
will be apparent not on a material level but mainly 
on a spiritual one. In other words, sharing the 
responsibility for the state of affairs in the world, 
China will substantially resort not to hard power 
but soft power. China brought forward many 
approaches and ideas corresponding to common 
interests of peoples of the world and to the 
course of history. Their influence will eventually 
grow”9.
In Gao Hui’s point of view, it is “China’s 
practice in successful promotion of reforms, 
transparency and following its independent way 
of development” that can be considered to be 
China’s soft national power”10.
 N.M. Spafarii, who visited China at 
the end of the XVII century, mentioned its 
residents’ special devotion to “writing and 
learning”11. According to I. d’Hooghe, in 
modern world China takes the second place 
regarding the volume of produced scientific 
knowledge12. By the year of 2004 the number 
of scientists had reached 926 thousand people, 
the number of students was 23 million people13. 
By 2020 China should become a state of an 
innovative type14. Not long ago Yan Xuetong, 
a Chinese outstanding political scientist in the 
sphere of international relations, stated that “if 
China fails to provide 80% of its youth with 
higher education it will not be able to catch up 
or excel others in technological innovations. 
To become an international center China has 
no other choice but to develop education”15. 
If only those domestic figures, speaking 
about “overproduction” of specialists with the 
diplomas of higher education in Russia, could 
hear this. Yet, it’s clear that there is a difference 
between educations.
N.M. Spafarii also stated that the Chinese 
yield to the Europeans in bravery but excel 
them in acumen and political pragmatism16. The 
Celestial Empire possesses an ancient tradition 
of strategic thinking the peculiar features of 
which are thorough analysis of long-term trends, 
attention to psychological and political factors, 
scrupulous study of tactical opportunities, search 
for unexpected moves and impartial evaluation 
of decision variants17. “Shi”-concept, the art of 
understanding things in their development, has a 
great importance18. 
H. Kissinger explains the difference 
between western and eastern types of strategic 
thinking dwelling upon the difference between 
chess and guo (Chinese: “weiqi”). In chess they 
play a decisive battle and the main battle is for 
the centre of the chess-board. Guo develops the 
flexibility of thinking: a player searches for a 
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relative advantage, strives to encircle a rival and 
risks to be unexpectedly encircled himself19.
In Chinese social philosophy there is the 
“molüe” concept. This word is roughly translated 
as “super-planning” that means a specific form 
of wisdom focusing on antagonism in its broader 
sense. “Мolüe” implies work with various 
conflict situations which includes analysis and 
evaluation of opportunities20. Thus, it is a specific 
humanitarian technology21 of preparation and 
making strategic decisions.
Traditional literature glorifies the strategists 
of the past who were able to benefit from 
advantageous factors, minimizing opportunities 
their rivals might use. Long ago, in the legendary 
epoch of the Three Kingdoms Shu Han actively 
used non-violent strokes of tactics which were 
supposed to undermine the enemy’s fighting 
efficiency22. From time immemorial they 
valued the skill to summit talks undermining 
the opponent’s confidence and thus gaining a 
psychological (if not material) superiority23.
According to X. Liao, the process of 
decision-making by Chinese leaders evolved from 
centralized to pluralistic elitism24. From December 
2002 the “fourth generation” of Chinese leaders 
“made it a rule to hold the so called jiti xuexi 
(collective meetings) for the politburo members to 
arm the top of the elite with “progressive practice 
of the whole mankind” (these were Hu Jintao’s 
words at the first meeting). By July 2004 fifteen 
“collective meetings” of such a kind had been 
held. Legal, economical, political, historical, 
military, technological and cultural issues were 
considered at these sessions. All the meetings 
were held by Hu Jintao. Outstanding scientists of 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, leading 
universities and military institutes were invited 
to participate in the discussions. These meetings 
equipped supreme leaders with a wide scope of 
new thoughts and knowledge. They also gave 
the specialists of “clever tanks” the opportunity 
to play the role of leaders’ assistants in the 
formation of a new vision of certain issues of the 
world importance”25.
The turn to humanitarian technologies of 
“distributed cognition” takes place on the local 
level as well. In the course of the experiment, 
conducted in the city of Tzego, small groups of 
citizens with the right to vote were chosen by a lot to 
make important and socially significant decisions. 
The groups of population were randomly chosen, 
given consultations by professional experts and 
then offered to vote for this or that decision26.
In modern world there often occur situations 
which require the quickest analysis of huge 
volumes of information as well as taking into 
account various variants of numerous actors’ 
actions in a constantly changing “battle field” 
for making a decision. According to N.V. Abaev, 
under such circumstances the ability to grasp the 
situation integrally in its outwardly discrepant 
unity and development, which was developed 
by Chinese Chán practitioners, may turn out to 
be more effective than a standard subject-object 
thinking limited in speed and efficiency of 
processing information  (especially in a stressful 
situation)27. One treatise runs: “The arrow goes 
up from the bow string but it doesn’t fly direct to 
the target; the target’s place is also not at the same 
place where it was when the calculations started. 
The latter turn out to be miscalculations. Thus, 
shooting comes to nothing”28. Chán psychotherapy 
focuses on development of intuitive wisdom 
(jñāna) instead of (or, probably, in addition to) 
conceptual thinking limited in its potential29. 
Integrating these practices with modern computer 
and info-psychological developments, China can 
get a unique humanitarian technology.
Dwelling upon humanitarian technologies 
of public relations, it should be noted that 
traditionally China’s power was devoid of 
publicity30. This tendency was inherited by 
communist China as well. For example, in 
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1970 Mao Zedong made only one political 
statement, in 1971 there were no statements 
at all31. In Maoist period a powerful but at the 
same time very straightforward system of mass 
information was developed. Its peculiar features 
were tough distribution of access (public mass 
media, military newspaper and a special bulletin 
for executives), idle talk, and formalism. Many 
events were either not mentioned or informed 
about with a considerable delay (for example, 
this or that leader’s dismissal was sometimes 
announced years later)32. However, the events 
that took place on Tiananmen Square in 1989 
clearly demonstrated the force of global mass 
media (and television, in particular) to Chinese 
leaders. The conclusions were drawn. Chinese 
thinkers speak of a discursive hegemony of West 
which makes such countries as China voiceless33. 
Modern People’s Republic of China is carrying 
on the policy directed towards overcoming this 
state of affairs. According to A.V. Shugaev, 
“if previously the Chinese authorities strove 
to protect national television against foreign 
influence, then now they actively involve its 
opportunities for the formation of favourable 
internal and external conditions of the country’s 
development”34. Central television has become 
“one of the most important instruments for the 
formation of the People’s Republic of China’s 
cultural identity… Its organizational structure, 
principles of functioning and making TV 
programmes, normative and legislative regulation 
are directed at strengthening of the Chinese 
nation’s traditional spiritual values, search for 
and adoption of new strategies of the country’s 
socio-cultural development”35. Broadcasting 
focusing on foreign audience is also actively 
developing. As the Chinese authorities plan it, 
CCTV should grow into a global informational 
station capable to compete with CNN36. By the 
way, this television station has been broadcasting 
in Russian since 200937.
At the beginning of 1970-ies the volume 
of the Xinhua News Agency’s foreign-policy 
reports, oriented towards foreign audience, was 
ten thousand words a day on average38. In 1997 
Xinhua’s number of words was approximately 
five hundred thousand words a day39, now it’s 
about two million. However, it’s not much in 
comparison with the Associated Press agency 
with approximately seventeen million words 
a day40.  The country’s authority would like 
Xinhua to work at the same quantitative and 
qualitative levels as the world leading agencies 
do41. CRI (China radio international) produces 
1100 programme hours in 38 foreign languages 
(apart from broadcasting in Chinese dialects) a 
day42.
The journalists definitely face specific 
difficulties caused by ideological policy of diktat 
of the Communist Party of China. According to 
X. Zhang, contradictions between a party logic 
and a market one as well as between the demands 
for professionalism and a party line are quite 
often in the work of Chinese media43.
Xu Angang and Zhang Xiaojun suggest 
working at strengthening of the main state news 
Internet portals as well, increasing the volume of 
news and the number of languages. At that it is 
vitally necessary to carry out structural reforms 
of Chinese media, contribute to their merging 
in large intersectoral corporations, keep up 
their going into the world, and provide Chinese 
companies, publishing newspapers and journals 
and establishing broadcasting companies abroad, 
with financial support and tax benefits. Experts 
believe that in a 5-10 years’ period of time China 
could create several media corporations of a 
world level44.
Millions of Chinese bloggers and Internet 
users are an important instrument of “soft 
power”. A number of the English language sites 
broadcasting the digest of a Chinese blogging 
sphere is growing45. 
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In China humanitarian technologies 
alternative to the western ones are well developed. 
It was in Mao Zedong’s lifetime when “hospitality 
technologies”, the art of charming foreign guests, 
was perfectly mastered in China. The receiving 
party used the arsenal typical for this purpose: 
excursions which were carefully thought over, the 
accompanying persons’ psychological mastery, 
skillful organization of “chance meetings”, 
delicious cuisine (in the country where an 
average peasant’s consumption level hadn’t 
grown since the beginning of the XX century) 
and subtle flattery. According to P. Khollander, 
“the degree of the intellectuals’ susceptibility” to 
such frauds is “directly proportional to the degree 
of their alienation from their own society”46. The 
representatives of the opposite subculture worry 
about their society’s shortcoming. That’s why 
other states’ criticism is not of a great importance 
for them47. The mechanism worked successfully. 
O. Topping, an American journalist, wrote: “I 
felt how China’s charm is penetrating into my 
body and soul. The whole world was becoming 
new and more colourful”48. The most significant 
guests were charmed by the Great Helmsman’s 
personal image of a “king-philosopher”49.
“Hospitality technologies” work nowadays 
as well. The Chinese willingly invite western 
intellectuals to their country, though giving 
priorities to luminaries in western thought but not 
to marginal revolutionaries as before. With the 
support of the Chinese leading higher education 
institutions the Naisbitt China Institute was 
founded especially for J. Naisbitt, an outstanding 
American futurologist. Expressing their deep 
gratitude to the receiving party, the Naisbitt 
couple enthusiastically describe dinners they 
were treated to by the distinguished officials of 
the People’s Republic of China50. The “China’s 
Megatrends” book by John and Doris Naisbitt 
became the result of this project. The book is 
extremely informative. It contains the elements 
of criticism but is complementary to the Chinese 
authorities (especially in “Tibet issue”51) in its 
general development of thoughts. The authors are 
certainly far from the idea that an outstanding 
thinker “sold himself for a mess of pottage”. 
Everything is much more subtle here. However, 
the potential of “hospitality technologies” must 
be neither under- nor overstated.
The concept of “guan-xi” takes an important 
place in Chinese social reality. Its English 
equivalent is probably “relations”. The “zou-
hou-men” expression (“through the backdoor”) 
is close to this term which means establishment 
of informal relations making it possible to 
“settle issues” within the frames of centralized 
hierarchical structures though unofficially but 
effectively52. The researchers state that fellow and 
old friendly relations were very important even 
in Maoist period53. It was then when the skill to 
establish informal communications, which was 
traditional for China, was used for creating a new 
humanitarian technology. Foreign guests, the 
Chinese leaders were concerned with for some 
reason or other, were given an unofficial status 
of “friends”. Following some conditions (for 
example, that of non-touching upon “three T-s” 
and namely the issues of Tibet, Taiwan and the 
Tiananmen Square protests of 1989) a foreigner 
keeps up “friendship” and is given honour, 
respect as well as material wealth. However, 
this status could be recalled any moment and 
without explaining the reasons54. Thus, in the 
period of “cultural revolution” even E. Snow, 
the first western journalist who wrote about 
the communist power in China, was refused a 
Chinese visa55.
Lobbyism is one of China’s humanitarian 
technologies deeply rooted in ancient times. One 
of the ministers of the Han Dynasty suggested 
the following way of treating the Xiongnu: “Give 
them skillfully dressed clothes and carts to win 
their eyes; give them delicious food to win their 
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mouths; give them music and females to win their 
ears; provide them with magnificent buildings, 
storehouses and slaves to win their liver… and 
those who agree to obey will be honoured by 
the emperor who will invite them to dinner and 
personally serve them with wine and food, thus 
winning their brains. These can be called five 
baits”56. As H. Kissinger states, traditionally the 
aim of such policy was a compliant scattered 
periphery rather than a Chinese direct control57.
“Guan-xi” ancient method of organization 
together with a scientific approach (the China’s 
Academy of Social Sciences is focusing its 
studies on the processes of taking decisions in 
the key countries of the world) made it possible 
for the People’s Republic of China to organize 
an effective system of lobbying its interests in 
legal and executive (and, probably, in judicial58) 
authorities within the shortest period of time. A 
bright example of this system’s successful work is 
blocking the initiative of W. Clinton, a President 
of the USA, and W. Christopher, a Secretary 
of State of the USA, to deprive China of the 
MFN (most favoured nation) status giving the 
possibility to trade with America on very good 
terms59. The researchers state that the richest 
people of the USA, including B. Gates, one of the 
“Microsoft” founders, are in China’s lobby.
R. Bernstein and R. Munro define a “new 
China’s lobby” as a multifaceted network structure 
governed mainly by promises and providing 
with material wealth60. In our opinion, lobbyism 
can’t be minimized to bribery as it implies the 
mastery of psychological analysis as well as the 
technology of psychological manipulation. A 
skillful lobbyist develops long-term systems of 
relations rather than distributes envelopes with 
cash. The activity of “China’s lobby” is, of course, 
not isolated. It is enriched by different methods, 
including PR-technologies61. According to a Hong 
Kong researcher, the Chinese government hires 
the most influential American law firms and PR-
companies. From 1997 till 2005 not less than 19 
million dollars were spent on this activity62.
One of humanitarian technologies closely 
connected with the conception of “soft power” 
is gongong waijiao (“social diplomacy”). J. 
Wang defines it as the country’s interaction and 
communication with foreign public in the form 
of a monologue, dialogue, or cooperation63. 
According to I. d’Hooghe, the subjects of China’s 
social diplomacy are such non-state actors 
as non-commercial organizations, business 
communities, universities, research institutes 
and individuals. Yet, a greater number of issues 
and events of public diplomacy are still initiated 
by public authorities (the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, in particular). This partly reduces the 
target audience’s confidence. However, certain 
interaction of state authority and civil society 
is inevitable here as public diplomacy yields 
no results in case it contradicts the state policy. 
The Chinese People’s Association for Friendship 
with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), Institute 
of Foreign Affairs (IFA) and student and 
youth organizations are among organizational 
structures working in the sphere of public 
diplomacy64. In some developing countries 
(Ethiopia, Laos and Myanmar, in particular) 
volunteers from the Chinese Young People’s 
Volunteer Army work65.
 Chinese societies abroad play a 
special role in public diplomacy. According to 
I. d’Hooghe, they act as both actors and aim of 
public diplomacy. They are a target group as 
China’s authorities are eager to win Chinese 
diasporas, existing in many countries, over to 
their side. On the other hand, such diasporas 
enable to popularize Chinese culture and 
lobby the People’s Republic of China’s political 
interests66. For example, Krasnoyarsk public 
organization “Chinese community” was one on 
the first to help those who suffered damage from 
the fire in Kazachinskoe village and contributed 
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to the organization of “Beijing – Moscow” motor 
race. 
One of the fundamental bases of 
Confucianism is the “li” (ceremony, ritual) 
principle. According to N.V. Abaev, a ritual 
has been regarded as an important means of 
the world organization and integration of the 
members of society since ancient times. In one of 
Confucius’s pupil’s point of view, a ritual “leads 
people to concord”. Music aiming at ennoblement 
of people, suggestion of the feelings of joy and 
harmony was attached a great importance in 
Confucian rituals67. A very old mastery of mass 
holidays organization showed its worth in the 
course of a 4-hour long ceremony of the opening 
of the Olympic Games in Beijing. One of the 
spectators gave the following descriptions of his 
feelings: “Conceptually it seemed a session of 
mass hypnosis: a sequence of unclear charming 
pictures to a melodic, subordinating rhythmic 
music. The pictures were such that a viewer 
couldn’t hide, abstract away from them even 
when in front of a TV-set”68. According to an 
Internet publicist, the ceremony’s conceptual 
base was a new life initiation; and, on the whole, 
the ritual can be characterized with the “Dragon 
is conceiving its generation” phrase69. The image 
of a spiral, representing the DNA structure and 
life, development in general, was actively used. 
There was a hint of an ambitious and energetic 
generation of the Chinese of the XXI century70. 
Three thousand “Confucians” reciting the 
passages from “Selected Sayings” as well as 
symbolic images of such Chinese inventions as 
paper and press were slotted in the scenario. It 
should be noted that in the respect of music the 
organizers managed to solve a most difficult task 
of integrating Chinese and European traditions71.
Focusing our special attention on the 
opening ceremony of the Olympic Games in 
Beijing, it is worthwhile mentioning that both this 
large-scale event and sport as it is are made use 
of as a humanitarian technology by the Chinese 
authorities. It is no coincidence that the first step 
to establishing good relations between America 
and China was the American ping-pong team’s 
trip to Beijing72. Humanitarian and technological 
potential of cinematograph is also made use of. 
On the 2nd of February 2012 Guan Moye, a writer 
and a Noble prize winner, Yao Ming, a retired 
Chinese professional basketball central player 
who played for the Houston Rockets (NBA) 
and the richest sportsman in China, and Jackie 
Chan, a famous actor, were appointed counselors 
of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference, the supreme advisory body in the 
political system of China73. 
Modern China is actively using the charm 
of Confucian tradition as its “soft power”. 
According to I. d’Hooghe, it is partly connected 
with the fact that the Chinese authorities treat 
the symbols of Chinese culture as apolitical and, 
thus, less potentially dangerous74. We argue the 
reasons lie deeper: the Chinese authorities realize 
that Marxism as it is doesn’t provide with the 
socio-cultural basis, quite strong for preserving 
the Chinese society’s integrity. However, it is 
indisputable that the name and image of Confucius 
is used for purely technological aims.
At the beginning of 2007 there were 123 
Confucius Institutes in 49 countries (12 of them 
functioned in Russia). They were founded in 
order to popularize the Chinese language and 
culture abroad. By 2010 the number of foreigners 
studying Chinese had to reach one hundred 
million people75.
The experience of the Goethe-Institute in 
Germany and the Cervantes Institute in Spain 
served the examples for the Chinese. Confucius 
Institutes were established in many countries of 
the world at an unprecedented speed: in 2006 a 
new branch of the institute appeared every four 
days76. By 2011 more than five hundred Confucius 
Institutes and their classrooms functioned in more 
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than eighty countries77. Moreover, there was a 
project on translation of Confucius’s Pentateuch 
into nine major languages in Europe and its 
publishing78. 
N.V. Abaev points out to Confucianism’s 
limitedness. In his opinion, this tradition’s rules 
aiming at suppressing egocentrism and anarchic 
tendencies are, on the contrary, heighten these 
negative traits and thus increase entropy79. 
According to L.Z. Eidlin, in China’s life and 
culture Confucianism formed a dialectic unity 
with Daoism being as if opposed to it80. In 
connection with this it is quite appropriate to 
remember the conception of functional interethnic 
conflict developed by S.V. Lur’e. This conflict 
enables people to achieve their various aims and 
purports and thus brings necessary dynamism to 
culture81. The Daoists asserted: “The solid and 
strong dies, the soft and weak lives”82.
According to V.G. Nemirovskii, orientation 
to the world’s integrity close to modern synergy 
is peculiar for Daoism. This tendency was also 
taken in by Chan imbibing many features peculiar 
to Daoism83.
During the civil war many spiritual leaders 
of Chan had to leave the country. The Chan 
legendary Shaolin Monastery suffered from 
the red guards’ raid. In 1970, however, it was 
restored84. The present Chinese leader Xi Jinping 
was reported to go in for traditional martial arts 
and Qigong respiratory gymnastics85. It can be 
supposed that today’s generation of the Chinese 
leaders fully involves the opportunities opened 
by Chan in the sphere of strategic thinking. 
Humanitarian and technological success 
of China is differently appraised by foreign and 
domestic observers. In J.S. Nye’s (Jr.) opinion, 
“China hasn’t cultural industry yet that can 
be compared to Hollywood or Bollywood; its 
universities yield to the American ones; this 
country lacks many non-commercial organizations 
generating soft power in the USA”86. In his article 
published in 2011 I. d’Hooghe argues that after 
several years of its constant growth the popularity 
of China in the West has recently gone down. 
Yet, many African countries and the countries 
of the Near East are still benevolent to China87. 
It should be noted that modern Chinese political 
analysts admit that China shouldn’t delude itself 
and rest on its laurels. True disclosure of China’s 
humanitarian-and-technological potential 
requires persistent systemic work.   
According to O. Borokh and A. Lomanov, 
“on the whole Chinese politicians proceed from 
the assumption that combination of soft and 
hard powers is needed to increase the state’s 
“joint power”. After “hard power”, including 
economical, scientific and technical as well 
as military components, has reached a certain 
level, accumulation of “soft power” and cultural 
attractiveness in particular can lead to the effect 
of a national power “multiplicator”88.
Yang Suetun, a political scientist, notes: 
“Within the boundaries of Chinese Asia we 
followed the Wang system. Outside its boundaries 
we followed the line of “hegemony” in our 
relations with the “barbarians”89. The political 
scientist suggests restoring the Wang system in 
today’s Asia on the basis of justice and observance 
of the rights of Asian subjects of international law. 
At that, naturally enough, Yang Suetun doesn’t 
name the countries to which the Ba system will 
be applied90.
According to Zhai Decyuan, “China’s 
defense policy is active defense”91. However, it 
should be noted that phraseology can be deceptive: 
invasion of Vietnam in 1979 was officially called 
a “self-defensive counter attack against Vietnam” 
in Chinese press92.
One of the issues of modern Chinese military 
and political analytics is “unlimited techniques of 
waging a war”. Three main forms of such actions 
are distinguished. These are military actions 
(from an atomic bomb to terrorism), non-military 
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actions (diplomatic war, war in informational 
networks, war with the use of contraband, drugs, 
war to frighten) and hostile actions (financial and 
trade wars, war by means of influence on control 
systems, war with the use of media, ideological 
war)93. According to Iu. Afanas’ev, Chinese 
military men are actively researching the means 
of psychological influence on an opponent, 
studying the experience of informational wars 
and consider it extremely important to pursue 
the military policy on the basis of international 
documents that can justify its own actions and 
denounce an opponent’s actions94.
Thus, modern China is actively developing 
a whole set of humanitarian technologies. For 
this it integrates the best world conceptions and 
practices with its own rich and very old social-
and-cultural practice. The best Chinese intellects 
are working at the technologies of strategic 
thinking, public relations, mass-media, public 
diplomacy, lobbyism, mass events organization, 
etc. At the same time much attention is given to 
“soft power”. The country’s leaders and analysts 
realize that preservation of integrity and the state’s 
foreign activity require the concord of “soft” and 
“hard” powers, giving rise to “smart power”. 
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«Мягкая сила» и «умная сила» 
современного Китая
С.А. Подъяпольский
Частно-практикующий юрист
Исследователь показывает, что современный Китай активно развивает целый комплекс 
гуманитарных технологий, совмещая лучшие мировые концепции и практики с собственным 
богатым и древним социально-культурным опытом. Лучшие умы КНР работают над 
технологиями стратегического мышления, «связей с общественностью», массмедиа, 
«общественной дипломатии», лоббизма, организации массовых мероприятий и т.д. Вместе 
с тем, уделяя большое внимание «мягкой силе», руководство и аналитики этой страны 
понимают, что сохранение целостности и эффективная внешняя деятельность государства 
требуют сочетания «мягкой» и «жесткой» сил, порождающего «умную силу».
Ключевые слова: «мягкая сила», «умная сила», гуманитарные технологии, Китай, «молюэ», 
общественная дипломатия.
